Qatar: The New Cairo Accord?

The Qatar deal among the bickering (and sometimes warring) Lebanese factions left a bad taste in my mouth. A déja vu taste, reminiscent of the " foul fool" of the Cairo Accord of the late 60's that established a de facto PLO state within the State of Lebanon.

We now have a Hezballah state within the State, since "Qatar" implicitly recognized the terrorist organization's right to operate its guerilla, its telecommunications network and other institutions within Lebanon, and with total impunity.

The parallels are striking, I can only hope that the results will be less devastating to Lebanon.

Another consequence of Qatar was to provide Heballah and its allies (aka the "opposition") with a veto power within the Lebanese Cabinet.

It is no wonder that Syria and Iran hailed the accord, but it is surprising that the West was "satisfied".

Has Lebanon just been sold to the Syro Iranian axis? What is the West getting in return?

Quoting a generally well-informed Middle East analyst: "The Qatar deal marks the most resounding strategic debacle the West has experienced [in the Middle East] since Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2005 and Israel’s failure to defeat Hizbollah in 2006."

Is Michel Suleiman Still Credible?

The latest events in Lebanon are casting a new shadow on Gen. Suleiman's credibility as a fair Lebanese leader, capable of leading the country to peace, prosperity and democracy.

Suleiman is suspect, first and foremost, because he was appointed during a time when Syria controlled Lebanon and all of its institutions. At the time, the Lebanese Army under Suleiman's leadership was responsible for oppressing the Lebanese who supported a Free Lebanon.

Since Syria's departure, Suleiman has not purged the Army from officers who were appointed by the Syrian regime in key positions. This may be due to the fact that he was one of them.

Suleiman's military has collaborated closely with Hizballa on many occasions, despite the fact that Hizballa is an illegal militia both from a Lebanese and an international perspective (i.e. various UN resolutions and the list of the Shiite militia as a terrorist organization by many states).

Finally, during the recent coup against the Lebanese government, Suleiman has done virtually nothing to prevent Hizballa from attacking rival media outlets, and private property including the burning of hundreds of civilian cars and the pillaging of the residences and offices of Members of the Lebanese Parliament. This has taken place under the watchful eye of Lebanese Army personnel and armored vehicles. The Lebanese Army went as far as request that Future TV stop its broadcasting "or else Hizballa would level the building" ...

Interesting Facts Surrounding Hizballa's "Coup"

While a lot has been written regarding the latest events of the week of May 4, 2008, some interesting conclusions can already be drawn:

1. The Lebanese cannot count on the West or moderate Arabs to defend them. The US, France, the UN and various Arab countries limited themselves to timid protests and appeals to a peaceful resolution of the situation. The UN's reaction was particularly weak, especially in light of the gross violations of resolutions 1559 and 1701 on the part of Hizballa and its allies.
   
2. By using its weapons and attacking Lebanese civilians, Hizballa has clearly shown that the said weapons can also be used to maintain their internal hegemony over its allies and enemies.
3. By burning and ravaging the media outlets and private businesses and charitable institutions of their rivals, Hizballa and its allies have provided a glimpse into what Lebanon might be like under their control.
4. The Assad portraits that have resurfaced in Hizballa-controlled Beirut, are a clear indication of the opposition's agenda: namely the return of the Syrian hegemony over Lebanon.
5. The Lebanese Army lost a certain amount of credibility vis a vis the Lebanese by not performing its duties. It failed to protect the civilian population from the onslaught of armed militiamen, and did not lift a finger to protect public and private property from the onslaught of vandals and looters. The Army was watching passively as militiamen broke into the Sunni media outlets and set them on fire.
6. A jubilant Aoun showed his true colors by declaring victory on behalf of Hizballa. His politburo had a tough time back-pedaling following his televised remarks.
   
7. Aoun showed the strong yellow tones of his Orange TV. It became the Christian arm of Hizballa's Al Manar TV. As a matter of fact, one would be hard pressed to tell the two apart.
   
8. The Sunni militias are an ineffective fighting force, especially when faced with the Hizballa and Amal militiamen. They collapsed entirely when under military pressure, and were unable to inflict any significant casualties on the assailants despite being on the defensive and having a tactical advantage.
9. Jumblatt's Druze militiamen, on the other hand, held their ground and inflicted a large number of casualties on the Hizballa assailants. Clearly, the mountain will be harder to invade than Beirut.
10. The Christian areas were mostly unscathed except from damage due to stray (and some not so stray) bullets coming from West Beirut. It is unclear whether the Christians would have been able to defend their areas effectively and whether the Aounists would have fought their fellow Christians on behalf of the Syro-Iranian axis.
    

Assad's Back in Beirut

With Bashar Assad's pictures back on the walls of Beirut, there is little question as to where the "opposition's" loyalty lies, and as to its ultimate agenda: the return on Syria's grip on Lebanon.