The Turkish Flotilla and the Disastrous Israeli Raid

The details about the Israeli raid against the Turkish -led flotilla that was attempting to break Gaza's naval embargo are still sketchy. It is however clear that the Israelis made serious, amateurish mistakes in their raid, turning the operation into a PR disaster of the worst kind.

It is true that the Israelis had no good options and were pushed onto a corner by Turkey. If they allowed the flotilla to proceed, they would have opened the gauntlet for many more "shipping expeditions" which would have opened the potential for massive weapons smuggling to Hamas. By interdicting the flotilla, they would further damage their relationship with Turkey, create bad PR and run the risk of incidents, like today's, in which there is civilian loss of life.

The Israelis chose to interdict, and ended up with the worst possible outcome. So what went wrong?

1. The interdiction happened in international waters, making the interception illegal based on international maritime law. This didn't need to happen, the interception could have happened much later, inside Israeli territorial waters. It is not known why the Israelis decided to intercept so early, possibly to take advantage of the night.
   
   
2. Knowing that the Turks and other pro-Palestinian activists were determined, the Israelis chose not to stop them using blank artillery shots, or shots across the bows of the incoming ships. They instead decided to land their marine commandos to take over the ships. This was fraught with risk. A defense expert suggested that it would have been better to damage the ship's propellers in order to prevent them from continuing their journey.
   
   
3. The naval commandos are not trained in crowd controls, they are trained killers, better used against terrorists or enemy troops. They failed to control the crowds and when some of them were abducted and they felt threatened, they followed their engagement rules and opened fire with deadly results.
   
   
4. Initially the commandos boarded the ships one by one, using a rope to descend from their Sea Stallion helicopter, allowing the activists to attack them individually, and capture the initial boarding party. It is being reported that the activists then took the captured commandos weapons (handguns and paintball guns) and opened fire on the other commandos. Knowing that the hundreds of people on the ships were hostile, a different tactic should have been used to overwhelm the activists instead of giving them the opportunity to single out the commandos.
   
   
5. The Israelis failed to jam electronic signals emanating from the flotilla, including photos and videos, allowing the activists to broadcast their propaganda before the Israelis could engage in damage control activities.

All the above is a poor reflection on the preparedness of the Israeli Defense Forces to deal with a reasonably anodyne threat. Whoever planned this operation is likely feverishly updating their resumes.