Monday, October 27, 2008

The Unusual Cross Border Attack Into Syria: A Warning to Bashar?


What is most striking about the attack against a Syrian farm across the border from Iraq is that the US has waited so long to do this.

Cross border attacks from Afghanistan into the Pakistani tribal areas have been routine business for a long time. These are meant to hit Al Qaeda and Taliban elements seeking refuge on the Pakistani side of the border, who themselves launch attacks against Afghan and coalition forces in Afghanistan. These operations have been remarkably successful in neutralizing terrorist leadership on the Pakistani-Afghan border.

The situation on the Syrian-Iraqi border has been similar: Terrorist fighters and weapons have been entering into Iraq from Syria, causing countless deaths among the Iraqi civilians, and coalition forces. The difference is that the US and its coalition partners have not done much about this, taking blows without responding.

This raises the obvious question: Why now?

Several theories present themselves:

1. The Bush administration is trying to detract attention from the current economic crisis and is somehow trying to get the McCain-Palin ticket elected. This is a fairly weak theory since the incident is of a small impact and won't make much ink flow, at least not in the US. If the US wanted to start an international incident, they would have sought a naval incident with Iran, sunk a couple of Iranian warships, for example.

2. This is business as usual, and an escalation of security operations in Northern Iraq, in the Mosul area. Mosul is the last significant Al Qaeda stronghold in Iraq, and is supplied in men and weapons from Syria. The US might have decided to put an end to that lifeline once and for all.

3. This is a warning message to Syria. It is unclear what the message is about, but it might be related to the situation in Iraq, pressuring the Syrians to maintain a tighter control on the border. Or the warning could be related to Lebanon. The Syrians have been massing their forces on the Lebanese border and making ominous threats. Some in Lebanon have been quite anxious of a Syrian invasion. The generally well informed Debka site posted this map of the Syrian deployments on the Lebanese border.

Whatever the reason might be, this raid is a clear indication that the Bush administration will maintain its no nonsense policy towards terrorists and their supporters.

Wednesday, May 21, 2008

Qatar: The New Cairo Accord?




The Qatar deal among the bickering (and sometimes warring) Lebanese factions left a bad taste in my mouth. A déja vu taste, reminiscent of the " foul fool" of the Cairo Accord of the late 60's that established a de facto PLO state within the State of Lebanon.

We now have a Hezballah state within the State, since "Qatar" implicitly recognized the terrorist organization's right to operate its guerilla, its telecommunications network and other institutions within Lebanon, and with total impunity.

The parallels are striking, I can only hope that the results will be less devastating to Lebanon.

Another consequence of Qatar was to provide Heballah and its allies (aka the "opposition") with a veto power within the Lebanese Cabinet.

It is no wonder that Syria and Iran hailed the accord, but it is surprising that the West was "satisfied".

Has Lebanon just been sold to the Syro Iranian axis? What is the West getting in return?

Quoting a generally well-informed Middle East analyst: "The Qatar deal marks the most resounding strategic debacle the West has experienced [in the Middle East] since Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2005 and Israel’s failure to defeat Hizbollah in 2006."

Saturday, May 10, 2008

Is Michel Suleiman Still Credible?


The latest events in Lebanon are casting a new shadow on Gen. Suleiman's credibility as a fair Lebanese leader, capable of leading the country to peace, prosperity and democracy.

Suleiman is suspect, first and foremost, because he was appointed during a time when Syria controlled Lebanon and all of its institutions. At the time, the Lebanese Army under Suleiman's leadership was responsible for oppressing the Lebanese who supported a Free Lebanon.

Since Syria's departure, Suleiman has not purged the Army from officers who were appointed by the Syrian regime in key positions. This may be due to the fact that he was one of them.

Suleiman's military has collaborated closely with Hizballa on many occasions, despite the fact that Hizballa is an illegal militia both from a Lebanese and an international perspective (i.e. various UN resolutions and the list of the Shiite militia as a terrorist organization by many states).

Finally, during the recent coup against the Lebanese government, Suleiman has done virtually nothing to prevent Hizballa from attacking rival media outlets, and private property including the burning of hundreds of civilian cars and the pillaging of the residences and offices of Members of the Lebanese Parliament. This has taken place under the watchful eye of Lebanese Army personnel and armored vehicles. The Lebanese Army went as far as request that Future TV stop its broadcasting "or else Hizballa would level the building" ...

Interesting Facts Surrounding Hizballa's "Coup"


While a lot has been written regarding the latest events of the week of May 4, 2008, some interesting conclusions can already be drawn:

  1. The Lebanese cannot count on the West or moderate Arabs to defend them. The US, France, the UN and various Arab countries limited themselves to timid protests and appeals to a peaceful resolution of the situation. The UN's reaction was particularly weak, especially in light of the gross violations of resolutions 1559 and 1701 on the part of Hizballa and its allies.
  2. By using its weapons and attacking Lebanese civilians, Hizballa has clearly shown that the said weapons can also be used to maintain their internal hegemony over its allies and enemies.
  3. By burning and ravaging the media outlets and private businesses and charitable institutions of their rivals, Hizballa and its allies have provided a glimpse into what Lebanon might be like under their control.
  4. The Assad portraits that have resurfaced in Hizballa-controlled Beirut, are a clear indication of the opposition's agenda: namely the return of the Syrian hegemony over Lebanon.
  5. The Lebanese Army lost a certain amount of credibility vis a vis the Lebanese by not performing its duties. It failed to protect the civilian population from the onslaught of armed militiamen, and did not lift a finger to protect public and private property from the onslaught of vandals and looters. The Army was watching passively as militiamen broke into the Sunni media outlets and set them on fire.
  6. A jubilant Aoun showed his true colors by declaring victory on behalf of Hizballa. His politburo had a tough time back-pedaling following his televised remarks.
  7. Aoun showed the strong yellow tones of his Orange TV. It became the Christian arm of Hizballa's Al Manar TV. As a matter of fact, one would be hard pressed to tell the two apart.
  8. The Sunni militias are an ineffective fighting force, especially when faced with the Hizballa and Amal militiamen. They collapsed entirely when under military pressure, and were unable to inflict any significant casualties on the assailants despite being on the defensive and having a tactical advantage.
  9. Jumblatt's Druze militiamen, on the other hand, held their ground and inflicted a large number of casualties on the Hizballa assailants. Clearly, the mountain will be harder to invade than Beirut.
  10. The Christian areas were mostly unscathed except from damage due to stray (and some not so stray) bullets coming from West Beirut. It is unclear whether the Christians would have been able to defend their areas effectively and whether the Aounists would have fought their fellow Christians on behalf of the Syro-Iranian axis.

Assad's Back in Beirut


With Bashar Assad's pictures back on the walls of Beirut, there is little question as to where the "opposition's" loyalty lies, and as to its ultimate agenda: the return on Syria's grip on Lebanon.

Thursday, February 14, 2008

Moghniyeh: Who Did it and Why?


Imad Moghniyeh had a taste of his own poison when he was blown up in Damascus two days ago. He was killed by explosives, the way he, himself, killed thousands of people. The difference is that those who killed Moghniyeh wanted to avoid killing innocent civilians by placing a small charge is the car carrying the terrorist.

Many are wondering who killed the terror mastermind and Hizballa's military chief. Theories abound, but the consequences are clear:

  • The death of Moghniyeh is both a blow to the morale of Hizballa and their operational capabilities. He was the terrorist organization's most trusted and capable operative.

  • The locale of the attack on Moghniyeh is a double blow to the Syrian regime: they were caught hosting one of the most wanted terrorists alive on one hand, and they have failed to protect him on the other.

  • The death of Moghniyeh is a clear signal to other terrorists that they cannot escape justice wherever they are.
The theories about the commandeers and perpetrators of Moghniyeh's killing are numerous:

  1. The Israelis did it. This is the most likely theory, given that Israeli intelligence is well renowned for this type of very targeted and complex operations. This theory is especially likely since the operation is almost identical to the one, also is Damascus, that has taken the life of Islamic Jihad leader Ghaleb Ghali 4 years ago.

  2. The Americans did it. This is a more unlikely scenario, despite the fact that the US has tried to kill Moghniyeh before. The US intelligence agencies tend to lack the capability to conduct such operations, even though such capabilities have been improving since 9/11.

  3. Nasrallah did it. It is widely believed that the Iranians have relieved Nasrallah from his command of the military arm of Hizballa following the war with Israel in the Summer of 2006. It is also believed that this has caused a schism within the terrorist organization. Could this have been a way for Nasrallah to reassert himself as the supreme military and political leader of the "Islamic Resistance"?

  4. The Syrians did it (scenario 1). The Syrian regime might have executed Moghniyeh in return for some major favor from the US and the West. Further, the Bush administration's almost simultaneous sanctions against the Syrian regime are nothing but a decoy in an attempt to protect the Syrian regime from any suspicion in the matter.

  5. The Syrians did it (scenario 2). A rogue element in the Syrian security apparatus that is loyal to the Sunni majority (people loyal to Khaddam) might have conducted the operation at the request of Saudi Arabia or a Western Power (the US or France).
Other, less credible, theories include the French, the Lebanese Forces, the Kuwaitis etc.

The real question is: What next? When will Hizballa retaliate, against whom and how?