The Turkish Flotilla and the Disastrous Israeli Raid

The details about the Israeli raid against the Turkish -led flotilla that was attempting to break Gaza's naval embargo are still sketchy. It is however clear that the Israelis made serious, amateurish mistakes in their raid, turning the operation into a PR disaster of the worst kind.

It is true that the Israelis had no good options and were pushed onto a corner by Turkey. If they allowed the flotilla to proceed, they would have opened the gauntlet for many more "shipping expeditions" which would have opened the potential for massive weapons smuggling to Hamas. By interdicting the flotilla, they would further damage their relationship with Turkey, create bad PR and run the risk of incidents, like today's, in which there is civilian loss of life.

The Israelis chose to interdict, and ended up with the worst possible outcome. So what went wrong?

1. The interdiction happened in international waters, making the interception illegal based on international maritime law. This didn't need to happen, the interception could have happened much later, inside Israeli territorial waters. It is not known why the Israelis decided to intercept so early, possibly to take advantage of the night.
   
   
2. Knowing that the Turks and other pro-Palestinian activists were determined, the Israelis chose not to stop them using blank artillery shots, or shots across the bows of the incoming ships. They instead decided to land their marine commandos to take over the ships. This was fraught with risk. A defense expert suggested that it would have been better to damage the ship's propellers in order to prevent them from continuing their journey.
   
   
3. The naval commandos are not trained in crowd controls, they are trained killers, better used against terrorists or enemy troops. They failed to control the crowds and when some of them were abducted and they felt threatened, they followed their engagement rules and opened fire with deadly results.
   
   
4. Initially the commandos boarded the ships one by one, using a rope to descend from their Sea Stallion helicopter, allowing the activists to attack them individually, and capture the initial boarding party. It is being reported that the activists then took the captured commandos weapons (handguns and paintball guns) and opened fire on the other commandos. Knowing that the hundreds of people on the ships were hostile, a different tactic should have been used to overwhelm the activists instead of giving them the opportunity to single out the commandos.
   
   
5. The Israelis failed to jam electronic signals emanating from the flotilla, including photos and videos, allowing the activists to broadcast their propaganda before the Israelis could engage in damage control activities.

All the above is a poor reflection on the preparedness of the Israeli Defense Forces to deal with a reasonably anodyne threat. Whoever planned this operation is likely feverishly updating their resumes.

Reports of an Iranian Submarine Unloads Suspicious Cargo in Beirut

According to a number of sources, a submarine flying the Iranian flag docked at Beirut harbor and unloaded some cargo that was whisked away on a number of small trucks.

A visual observer located about half a mile from the harbor suggested that the submarine was a Russian-made Kilo Class submarine.

An even more troubling report mentioned that the crew members who manipulated the cargo were wearing "hazmat" suits, which indicates, if true, that the cargo contained hazardous material, possibly chemical, biological or radiological agents.

The use of a submarine would have ensured that the cargo would not be intercepted by the UN forces patrolling the waters off Lebanon to prevent the supply of weapons to Hezbollah, or the Israeli navy nearby.

The delivery of weapons of mass destruction to Hezbollah by Iran would be intolerable to Israel as it alters greatly the strategic balance in the region, and increases the potency of the Iranian proxy by at least an order of magnitude.

The fact that the delivery followed a direct route from the the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to Hezbollah might point to a level of distrust between Iran and Syria, or a Syrian reluctance to participate in such a dangerous escalation.

One word of caution, however, the reports are not from the most reliable of sources and may not be accurate. Similar information was reported by PJTV, an online conservative media outlet.

Mount Lebanon Municipal Elections - The Aftermath

While minor in the Lebanese political context, the Mount Lebanon municipal elections that took place last weekend have had at least one significant impact: They have clearly shown that the Aounist movement is losing its appeal within the Christian population.

Indeed, the only major Aounist political victory was in Hadeth, in the Southern Metn district. That victory would not have been possible without the massive vote of the Shiites present in the area. In the Jbeil (Byblos) election, the Aounists were trounced by a coalition supported by the Christian parties of the March 14 movement. It even appears that the Shiites in Jbeil did not fully support the Aounists, which is in itself quite interesting.

The main remaining battle between the two major Christian coalitions will be in the city of Zahle, this coming weekend. It is said that the Syrians and Iranian services operating in Lebanon are spending large amounts of money to support the list supported by Aoun and Skaff. A defeat in Zahle will deal a severe blow to the Aounists.

Why are the Aounists losing their popular support among the Lebanese Christians? While there are no formal polls on the subject, I believe the Christians are increasingly worried about the unconditional support that Aoun is offering Hezbollah. They are also worried about the increasing war rhetoric between the Shiite militia and Israel which could bring a huge catastrophe on Lebanon.

I predict, based on conversations I have had with mid-level leaders within the Aounist movement that, sooner or later, there will be a rebellion inside the Aounist movement against its leader that will lead into a new political party. This new party will bring back the pro-Lebanon ideology to the movement.